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ABSTRACT
This paper presents intergenerational evidence in favor of the hypothesis that a significant factor
explaining the increase in female labor force participation over time was the growing presence of
men who grew up with a different family model--one in which their mother worked. We use
differences in mobilization rates of men across states during WWII as a source of exogenous
variation in female labor supply. We show, in particular, that higher WWII male mobilization rates
led to a higher fraction of women working not only for the generation directly affected by the war,
but also for the next generation. These women were young enough to profit from the changed
composition in the pool of men (i.e., from the fact that WWII created more men with mothers who
worked). We also show that states in which the ratio of the average fertility of working relative to














InFernández, Fogli and Olivetti (2002) weexplored the idea that the family canbe
an important agent of preference formation and that, in particular it could be an
important factor in explaining the evolution of women’s labor force participation
over time. Speci…cally, we argued that a signi…cant determinant of the increase
in women’s involvement in the formal labor market was the increasing number of
men who, over time, grew up in a family in which their mother worked. Men
who were brought up by a working mother, we showed, were signi…cantly more
likely to be married to women who worked. Hence, it could be that the increased
presence of this new type of man–one that grew up with a working mother–makes
it more palatable to be a working woman and, we speculated, to therefore invest
more in market skills.1
Our empirical evidence, however, was all cross-sectional and aimed at showing
that the positive correlation between the working behavior of a man’s mother and
that of his wife was not driven by other factors such as religion, education, geogra-
phy or social networks. It did not investigate the critical dynamic implications of
our theory, namely, that exogenous variations in the proportions of men brought
up by working women would have implications for the following generation’s labor
force participation. In this paper we now turn to the intergenerational evidence.2
The objective of this companion paper is to quantify the e¤ect of our pref-
erence formation mechanism on the rise of female labor supply, by exploring the
intergenerational consequences of two di¤erent sources of variation in the propor-
tion of men brought up by working mothers. We …rst make use of idiosyncratic
di¤erences across US states in the impact of WWII on married women’s labor
supply to provide exogenous variation in the proportion of men raised by working
mothers. We analyze the e¤ect of WWII on the labor supply of the 1930-35
cohort of women, a cohort that was too young to be directly a¤ected by the war,
but that was the right age to be a¤ected by the change in the available pool of
men a few decades later. We contrast the indirect e¤ect of the war on this cohort
with its direct e¤ect on older cohorts and show that although the direct e¤ect
1See Goldin (1990) for an extensive account of the historical evolution of women’s role in the
society.
2Standard explanations for the increase in women’s labor supply rely mostly on technological
factors. See for example Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2004) and Goldin and Katz
(2002). Pencavel (1998) and Smith and Ward (1985) study the role of changes in the wage
structure in explaining female labor supply. They …nd that wages cannot explain a large
proportion of the observed changes.
1of WWII faded for the older cohorts over time, its indirect e¤ect on the younger
cohort persisted. By the time the cohorts reach the age of 45-50, there is no
longer a direct e¤ect of the war on the older cohorts’ labor supply whereas the
indirect e¤ect on the 1930-35 cohort is still present and strong: we …nd that a
10% higher mobilization rate is associated with 3.3 additional weeks worked by
45-50 years old women in 1980, which represents almost 16% of the total increase
in weeks worked on average by this age group between 1940 and 1980.
Our second source of variation comes from di¤erences across US states in
the average fertility of working relative to non-working women. Our theory
implies that, for a given level of female labor supply, states with higher ratios
in the average fertility of working relative to non-working women should have
greaterfemale labor supply the followinggeneration. We examine the relationship
between this measureof relative fertility andnext generation’s femalelabor supply
across US states over several decades and show that the correlation in the data is
positive and signi…cant as predicted by the theory.
2. World War II
World War II can be usefully viewed as providing an “exogenous” shock to female
labor supply. As men were mobilized to serve in the war, women increased their
labor force participation markedly. In 1940, only 28% of women over age 15
participated in the labor force. By 1945 this …gure exceeded 34%.3
Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) argue that variations in the importance
of this shock across states—captured by di¤erentials in the mobilization rate of
men across states—can be used to provide exogenous variation in women’s labor
supply. Their empirical strategy is to use WWII mobilization rates as the …rst-
stage regression in an analysis of the e¤ects of the increase in female labor supply
on the wage structure. In this paper we also make use of the variation provided
by di¤erences in mobilization rates on female labor supply across states. Unlike
these authors, however, we are interested in identifying the e¤ects of this variation
on the labor supply of women many years later and, most importantly, we wish to
identify the “echo” e¤ect that this variation should have, according to our theory,
for the cohort of women who were young enough during WWII to be a¤ected by
the change in the available pool of men in the next generation.
3See Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002). Goldin (1991) shows that half of the women who
entered the labor force during the war period had exited the labor force by 1950, still leaving a
large increase in participation.
2The basic logic of our exercise is as follows. World War II directly a¤ected the
work behavior of women during the war years. As we will show, the di¤erential
e¤ect of the war did not fade immediately; rather it lingered for several decades
in the work behavior of those women who were old enough in the 1940s to be
directly a¤ected by the war. As these women aged, however, the e¤ect of the war
on their work behavior appears to have slowly faded. By the time these women
reach the age of 45-50, there does not appear to be a di¤erential e¤ect of the war
on their labor supply. A younger generation of women—those born in 1930-35
(who were thus 7-12 years old in 1942)—was too young to be directly a¤ected
by the war, but not too young to be a¤ected by the change in their mothers’
work behavior. As we show, the war a¤ected this cohort’s labor supply as well.
Most importantly, although the e¤ect of WW2 faded for the older cohorts, its
in‡uence on the labor supply of this later cohort persisted. This is an e¤ect that
our theory would predict, as the change in these women’s labor supply did not
depend on whether they worked during the war, but rather on the expectations
they formed, then and after, as to the return to investing in market skills. The
return to becoming a working woman had increased, according to our hypothesis,
since more boys had been raised by a working mother.
We investigate our hypothesis in several steps. The …rst step is to show that,
as posited, the mobilization rate of men during World War II had a positive e¤ect
on the labor supply of the mothers of the 1930-35 cohort. The second step is to
trace out the echo e¤ect of the war over the life cycle of the 1930-35 cohort by
contrasting the indirect e¤ect of the war on the labor supply of this cohort with
the direct e¤ect of the war on older cohorts at the same age.
2.1. The Data Set
We use data from the one-percent Integrated Public Use Microsample (IPUMS)
of the decennial Census for the decades 1940 to 1980.4 We restrict our attention
to white married women belonging to the following three age groups: 25-30, 35-
40, and 45-50. We exclude women living in farms or working in agricultural
occupations, as well as those living in group quarters (e.g. prisons, and other
group living arrangements such as rooming houses and military barracks).5
4In particular, we use the general 1% sample for 1940 and 1950 and the 1960. For the 1970
we use the 1% State Sample (Form 1) and for the 1980 we use the 1% Metro Sample (Sample
B).
5We exclude the following occupations (based on the 1950Census de…nition): farmers (owners
and tenants), farm managers, farm foremen, farm laborers as wage workers, farm laborers as
3Our primary measure of female labor supply is the number of weeks worked
in the previous year. In 1960 and 1970, Census information on weeks worked is
reported in intervals (1-13 weeks, 14-26 weeks, 27-39 weeks, 40-47 weeks, 48-49
weeks and 50-52 weeks). For these decades we compute our measure of weeks
worked by assigning the midpoint of each interval. For 1940, 1950 and 1980 we
use the information on actual number of weeks worked that is available in the
Census.6 For 1950, information on weeks worked is only available for sample line
persons, hence we use the appropriate sample line weights in the analysis. For
the remaining decades we use the appropriate person weights that indicate the
number of people in the population that each sampled individual represents. The
summary statistics for our sample are reported in the Appendix. Since we assign
mobilization rates by women’s state of birth, we exclude women born outside the
US as well as those born in Alaska and Hawaii since these were not states until
the 1950s.
Our mobilization rate variable is the same used in Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle
(2004).7 They use published tables from the Selective Service System (1956) and
construct men’s mobilization rates during WWII as the fraction of the 18 to 44
yearsoldregistered malesina statewho weredraftedfor war.8 Mobilizationrates
variedsubstantially across states, from less than 42% in Georgia, the Dakotas and
the Carolinas, to more than 52% in Washington, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire,
Oregon, and Massachusetts. The state di¤erences in war mobilization re‡ect a
variety of factors. The Selective Service’s guidelines for deferments were based
on marital status, fatherhood, essential skills for civilian war production, and
temporary medical disabilities, but also left considerable discretion to the local
boards. Farm employment, in particular, was a major cause of deferment as
maintaining food supply was considered essential to the war e¤ort. In Table I we
report various characteristics of states by level of mobilization rate (low, medium,
unpaid family workers, and farm service laborers as self-employed.
6In the 1940 Census respondents were required to report this information in terms of “equiv-
alent full-time weeks.” It was up to respondents to determine precisely what “full-time” meant,
though enumerators were instructed to suggest that 40 hours was a good round …gure. In
essence, respondents were to estimate how many hours they had averaged per week, multiply
this …gure by 52 weeks, then divide by 40 (See Census codebook).
7We thank the authors for making the data available to us.
8Since all men in the age bracket 18-44 were registered, their mobilization rate variable
represents the fraction of men in this age range who have served. Mobilization rates for Nevada
and Washington D.C. are not available (the former because it saw large population changes
during this time period).
4and high). As seen in this table, the mobilization rate was higher in states
with higher average male education, with lower percentage black, and with lower
proportion of the male population that were farmers. The average mobilization
rate is .474 with a standard deviation of .035.
To attempt to control for systematic variation in the mobilization rate, our
regressions include the 1940 fraction of non-white men aged 13 to 44, the 1940
fraction of men between the ages of 13 to 44 who are not farmers and the 1940
average education of men in this same age group.9 As shown in Acemoglu et al.,
after controlling for these factors and for other non-economic components (such
as the age composition and the number of german-born men) there is still some
thirty per cent variation of mobilization rates across states that is left unexplained
and which is attributed to idiosyncratic strategies followed by local registration
boards.10
2.2. Model Speci…cation and Results
We now describe our analysis of the impact of WWII on the working behavior
of married women. Our analysis pools married women born in 1930-35 with
married women from earlier cohorts and contrasts the indirect e¤ect of the war
on the 1930-35 cohort with the direct e¤ect of the war on the earlier cohorts. For
a meaningful comparison, we look across cohorts at the same age (i.e., we take
their labor supply in the decade in which they reach the speci…ed age).
We run the following basic regression:
wist = X
0
istﬂ1 + ￿t e X
0
istﬂ2t + ￿te0
sﬂ3t + ﬁt￿tms + ds + ￿t + "ist (2.1)
where wist measures weeks worked by woman i born in state s at time t, X
0
ist
represents a set of individual characteristics: age dummies, state of residence
dummies, and husbands’ state of birth dummy. In e X
0
ist the age dummies are
interacted with a year e¤ect ￿t (for each decade following 1940). We also include
a year dummy, a state dummy, ds, and the aforementioned set of state-level 1940
economic variables (farmers, non-whites, and average education) interacted with
the year dummy.
Our variable of interest is the interaction of the mobilization rate variable, ms,
assigned by female state of birth, with the time dummy, ￿t. The coe¢cient ﬁt
measures whether states with higher mobilization rates during WWII experienced
9Men who are 13 in 1940 would be 18 in 1945 and therefore part of the draft target group.
10See Table 4 in Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004).
5a larger increase in female labor supply in decade t. Since the key variable on the
right-hand side only varies by state and year, all the standard errors we report in
this experiment are corrected for clustering at the state-year level.
In 1935, the average age of a white woman giving birth was 26.8.11 Thus,
we study the mothers of our cohort of interest (1930-35) by examining the labor
supply of married women born in 1903-1908. We run a regression similar to the
one speci…ed in (2.1), pooling the observations for the mothers’ cohort with that
of the cohort born ten years earlier. Instead of assigning variables by state of
birth, however, we assign them by state of residence since this is more likely to
correspond to the state where the woman lived during WWII. As the 1903-08
cohort was 42 to 47 years old in 1950, we pool 42-47 years old in 1940 with the
same age group in 1950. Table II reports the results.
As shown in the table, we obtain a point estimate for ﬁ of 19.6. This implies
that a 10% increase in the mobilization rate is associated with an increase in fe-
male employment for this age group of 1.96 weeks between the beginning and the
end of the 1940 decade. To interpret the magnitude of this e¤ect, note that white
married women of this age were working on average 6.7 weeks in 1940. Hence
this number represents an increase of around 30% in their labor supply. Thus,
we conclude that the women most likely to have children in 1930-35 signi…cantly
increased their labor supply substantially more in those states in which the mo-
bilization rate of men was greater. These states, therefore, would have had a
greater increase in the proportion of men brought up by working mothers.
We now turn to the analysis of the labor supply of our cohort of interest:
women born in 1930-35. We proceed similarly to what we did for the mothers’
cohort, by pooling the 1930-35 cohort with preceding ones at a given point in their
life cycle, but assigning variables by state of birth. Our results are reported in
Table III.
We start by examining cohorts at the age of 25-30 (and thus pool our cohort in
1960 with the 1920-25 cohort in 1950 and the 1910-15 cohort in 1940). As shown
in column 1 of panel A, the coe¢cient on the mobilization rate interacted with
1950 is positive (and almost signi…cant at the 10% level). We would interpret
this as the direct e¤ect of the war on the women born in 1920-25, as they were
close to their early 20s during the war. What we call the “indirect” e¤ect of the
war can be seen in the coe¢cient on the mobilization rate interacted with 1960.
The 1930-35 cohort was too young to be a¤ected directly by the war, but not too
11Calculated from the Statistical Tables on Births: Live Births by Age of Mother and Race:
United States, 1933-1998 (National Center for Health Statistics web page).
6young to be a¤ected by the fact that they had more working mothers. As our
theory predicts, the coe¢cient on the mobilization rate in 1960 is positive and
signi…cant, showing that this cohort was also a¤ected, albeit indirectly, by the
war.
The next two columns in panel A of Table III repeat this regression with some
modi…cations. The second column includes dummies for the state of residence
and for the husband’s state of birth. Of course, the state of birth of a woman’s
husband is an endogenous variable (in the sense that she chooses whom to marry
and this may be a relevant characteristic), as is her state of residence. The
question is whether a woman born in a particular state, with a given mobilization
rate, formed her expectations about the proportion of men with working mothers
in that state, or in her current state of residence. This depends on when she
moved, among other things. As this is something we cannot determine, we …nd
it of interest to run our regression both including and omitting these controls.
The third column also includes these variables but restricts the sample to those
women whose state of residence is the same as their state of birth. This allows
us to not worry about what should be the "correct" mobilization rate for women
who moved. In all regression speci…cations, the mobilization rate is positive (and
almost signi…cant) in 1950 and it is positive and signi…cant in 1960. Note that
the coe¢cient of 26 implies that a 10% increase in the mobilization rate increased
this age group’s labor supply by 2.6 weeks, an increase of some 25% over the 8.8
weeks that women of this age group were working in 1940.
Panels B and C in Table III repeat the same exercises as above for the ages of
35-40 and 45-50. As before, the …rst column does not include state of residence
and husband state of birth dummies and the third column is restricted to women
who reside in the same state as their state of birth.
Panel B shows that both the 1910-15 and the 1920-25 cohorts worked more
at the age of 35-40 (i.e., in 1950 and 1960, respectively) in states that had higher
mobilization rates. This represents the direct e¤ect of the war on these cohorts.
As shown by the third entry in the columns, the indirect e¤ect of the war is
also present: the 1930-35 cohort also worked more in 1970 in states with higher
mobilization rates. It is interesting to note that already at this point we can
see the fading direct e¤ect of the war as shown in the decrease in the coe¢cient
that accompanies the mobilization rate from 1950 to 1960. The coe¢cient on
the mobilization rate in 1970 in the third column implies that an increase in the
mobilization rate of 10% accompanied a 2.2 weeks increase in the labor supply of
women of age 35-40 in 1970. As women of that age were working on average 7.4
7weeks in 1940, this implies an increase of almost 30 percent.
Lastly, panel C examines women at the age of 45-50. As by the time women
reach this age it is more likely they no longer reside in their state of birth (indeed,
our sample of women decreases by a third), we will concentrate on the results
reported in the third column. As shown, there was a direct e¤ect of the war
on women from the 1900-05 cohort in 1950. However, unlike the other cases,
the e¤ect of the war has basically completely worn o¤ by the time the next two
cohorts (1910-15 and 1920-25) reach 45 to 50, in 1960 and 1970, respectively. The
coe¢cient on the mobilization rate is insigni…cant. The result is dramatically
di¤erent for our 1930-35 cohort: in 1980 the e¤ect of the war on women is again
positive, statistically signi…cant, and quantitatively important. Women of this
age worked around 3.3 weeks more in 1980 than in 1940 in states with a 10%
higher mobilization rate; this is an increase of almost 60% relative to the 5.5
weeks worked on average by this age group in 1940.
To explore our last result in greater depth, we next pool our 45-50 years old
women two cohorts at a time, and examine the e¤ect of the mobilization rate in
explaining the variation in female labor supply in the later of the two cohorts.
This approach allows us to examine the incremental e¤ect of the war on the later
of the cohorts under comparison. It also allows the state of birth e¤ect to change
with the pair of cohorts examined.
As shown in Table IV, the pattern is similar to that obtained in Table III.
That is, there is a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of the war on 45-50 years old
women in 1950 (i.e., on the 1900-05 cohort in 1950), there is no additional e¤ect
of the war in 1960 relative to 1950 (i.e. on the 1910-15 cohort in 1960), there is
no additional e¤ect of the war in 1970 relative to 1960 (i.e., on the 1920-25 cohort
in 1970), and lastly there is a positive, signi…cant, and quantitatively important
additional e¤ect of the war in 1980 relative to 1970 (i.e., on the 1930-35 cohort in
1980). This last result shows that not only does the variation in the mobilization
rate help to explain the labor supply of 45-50 years old women in 1980 relative to
1940 (as shown in Table III), but it also helps explain the labor supply of women
this age in 1980 relative to 1970. That is, at this point the indirect e¤ect of the
war is su¢ciently large relative to the direct e¤ect, that it signi…cantly explains
the labor supply of the 1930-35 cohort relative to the 1920-25 cohort. The value
of 20 of the mobilizationcoe¢cient in1980 implies that a 10% higher mobilization
rate is associated with a 2 weeks increase in the average number of weeks worked
by 45-50 years old marriedwomen in 1980. Given that married women of this age
were working on average 21.8 weeks in 1970, this represents around a 9% increase
8in the number of weeks worked.12
We conclude from the evidence above that WWII directly a¤ected the labor
supply of older cohorts and indirectly a¤ected a younger cohort. This younger
cohort was too young to have changed its labor supply in direct response to the
war. Nonetheless, it witnessed a permanent increase in its labor supply that
varied across states with the mobilization rate of men. Our hypothesis is that
this was a response to the increase in the number of men brought up by working
mothers. The indirect e¤ect of the mobilization rate on this particular cohort’s
labor supply is present at all points in the life cycle that we have examined, which
also distinguishes it from the direct e¤ect of the war which appears to fade as the
earlier cohorts age.
Our analysis of the direct and indirect e¤ects of the war also allows us to
provide a rough estimate of the intergenerational e¤ect that, according to our
model, stems from having more sons brought up by working mothers. In particu-
lar, the ratio of the coe¢cient on the mobilization rate of the younger generation
(the indirect e¤ect) to the same coe¢cient for the mothers’ generation (the di-
rect e¤ect), can be interpreted as the e¤ect of an exogenous increase in the labor
supply of married women on next generation’s female labor supply. This ratio
is 1.67, which implies that if married women of the age to have young children
exogenously increase their labor supply by one week, we expect an increase in the
labor supply of the next generation of approximately 1.67 weeks.13 It follows
that the ampli…cation mechanism deriving from the intergenerational channel is
quantitatively large.14
2.3. Alternative Interpretations
Our interpretation of the results obtained from our WWII analysis can be chal-
lenged by three alternative hypotheses. We next turn to a discussion of these
and show that our explanation dominates these alternatives.
A …rst competing explanation is that the intergenerational e¤ect we observe
12We …nd similar results when we run this regression exercise for the entire sample of white
married women with and without state of residence and husband state of birth dummies.
13We compute this number by dividing the coe¢cient obtained for the younger generation by
19.64 (the coe¢cient obtained for the older generation from Table II). The magnitude of the
numerator depends on the age and speci…cation, of course. Using the coe¢cient obtained when
they are 45-50 years old in the third speci…cation in Table III, we get 1.67.
14One should expect the size of this e¤ect to decrease over time, as the economy approaches
a steady state.
9is brought about by working mothers a¤ecting their daughters directly. A sec-
ond hypothesis is that society was most transformed in those states with higher
mobilization rates, making it easier for women to work in those states in the fu-
ture. Although our dynamic empirical results alone cannot distinguish between
our hypothesis and these alternatives, the cross-sectional evidencepresented inour
earlier work indicates that our dynamic e¤ect results, at least in large part, from
the e¤ect of working women on their sons. It is primarily to examine the possi-
bility that the intergenerational e¤ect works from mothers to daughters directly
that we turn to the “Female Labor Force Participation and Marital Instability”
(FLFPMI) data set.15 This data set has the couple, rather than the individual,
as the unit of analysis and contains background information for both husband and
wife. It makes therefore possible to study a married woman’s working behavior
as a function of her own mother’s working behavior at the time she was growing
up. From this analysis we are able to conclude that the e¤ect of the working
behavior of a woman on her daughter’s working behavior appears to be negligible.
Moreover, in Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti [2002] we show that the e¤ect of the
working behavior of a woman’s mother in law on the probability that she works
is quantitatively large, suggesting that, in addition to any societal norms, the
family plays an important role.16 Furthermore, as our results for women 45-50
years old demonstrates, the e¤ect of WWII on the work behavior of women this
age disappeared in the 1960s and 1970s (that is, for cohorts born in 1910-15 and
1920-25), only to resurface again in the 1980s for our 1930-35 cohort. It is hard
to think why changes in societal norms would give rise to this pattern.
A last possibility is that our dynamic results are really the consequences of
the GI Bill. The GI Bill subsidized college education for WWII veterans. Male
college enrollment jumped by more than 50 percent from the pre-war (1939) level
of 1.3 million to over 2 million men in 1946. Approximately 1 in 8 veterans
attended college. If the number of men attending college increased by most
in those states with the highest rate of mobilization, and if women “followed”
men into college, then the positive correlation between the greater tendency of
women from the 1930-35 cohort to work and the mobilization rate of men across
states could simply be a consequence of how this cohort increased its education
di¤erentially across states.
To examine the validity of this alternative hypothesis, weperform thefollowing
15To our knowledge, in the past this dataset has been used only by sociologists.
16From 24 to 32 percentage points depending on the dataset and de…nition of work that we
use.
10two exercises. First, we examine the correlation between the increase in the aver-
age education of women in a state and that state’s mobilization rate. Comparing
the average education of white women born in a given state in 1920-25 relative to
those borna decade later in 1930-35, we …ndthat, averagingacross states, average
education increased by .53 years, from 11.15 to 11.68 years.17 The correlation
between a state’s change in average female education and its mobilization rate
is negative and insigni…cant, independently of whether we assign education by a
woman’s current state of residence or whether we restrict our sample to women
born in the same state as which they reside. Computing the partial correlation
after controlling for the 1940 conditions in the state, in the same way as before,
changes the sign of the correlation to positive, but likewise is statistically insignif-
icant. Thus, the results of this …rst exercise make it doubtful that our …ndings
are driven by the GI Bill.
To dispel any remaining doubts, we redid our WWII exercise controlling di-
rectly for a woman’s level of education (an endogenous variable). Note that our
theory also implies a positive relationship between mobilization rates and female
education: a woman is likely to …nd additional education more attractive if she
is planning to work in the market.18 Thus, even if once we controlled for ed-
ucation the e¤ect of mobilization rates on working became insigni…cant, this in
itself would not be evidence against our theory. On the other hand, …nding a
signi…cant e¤ect of the mobilization rate variable on female labor supply even
after controlling for education is evidence in favor of our theory. It shows that
the e¤ect of the mobilization rate does not go solely through education, which it
would in the case of the GI Bill.
The last column in Table III repeats the regression for the speci…cation in col-
umn three, but also includes a set of education dummies as well as these dummies
interacted with a year dummy. Education is measured as the highest grade of
school attended or completed by the respondent and falls into one of 9 possible
categories.19 As can be seen, the results are very similar to the ones in the pre-
17We calculate women’s education in the decade the cohort reaches 35-40 years, i.e., 1960 and
1970, respectively for the earlier and later cohort. Education is measured as the highest grade
of school attended or completed by the respondent. This variable is topcoded at 6 years of
college education (so all individuals with more than 6 years of college are assigned 18 years of
education).
18Of course market skills and education are not synonymous. In fact, when we control for
female education in our cross-sectional regression, we still …nd that men with working mothers
are more likely to work. Hence the e¤ect does not run solely through education.
19The nine categories are: none or preschool, grade 1 to 4, grade 5 to 8, grade 9, grade 10,
11vious column, with exactly the same pattern of positive and signi…cant results,
and quantitatively similar magnitudes. This allows us to conclude that increased
education is not what is driving our results.
3. Fertility Ratio
An interesting implication of our theory is that, ceteris paribus, states in which
working women have more children relative to non-working women should have
greater female labor supply in the next generation. This follows from the fact
that, everything else equal, the larger is the average fertility of working relative to
non-working women (hereafter denoted the “fertility ratio” for short), the larger
will be the proportion of men in the following generation whose mothers worked.
If our theory is correct, this should make investing in market skills more attractive
for women in the next generation, thereby increasing female labor supply.
In this section we examine the relationship between the fertility ratio across
states and female labor supply twenty years later. We regress various measures
of female labor supply on a set of individual-level characteristics (age and marital
status) and on two state level variables that are assigned to women by their state
of birth. For this exercise we restrict attention to women whose state of birth
coincides with her state of residence and pool data from the 1960, 1970, and 1980
Census. We use the following speci…cation:
List = X
0






+ ds + ￿t + "ist
In this regression List measures the labor supply of a 25-30 years old woman
born in state s at time t. Xist represents a set of individual characteristics: age
dummies and marital status dummies and both variables interacted as well with
time dummy. All the regressions also include state of birth dummy ds and a time
dummy ￿t.
There aretwostate-level variables. The …rst, Lst¡20, is thetwenty-years-lagged
average labor supply of women 30 to 35 years old, assigned by the individual’s
state of birth. This variable is introduced in order to control for the “initial”
level of female labor supply in each state. To examine our thesis, we used three
alternative de…nitions of labor supply. The …rst, labor force participation (LFP),
is anindicator variable that takesthe value of one if awomanwas inthe laborforce
grade 11, grade 12, 1 to 3 years of college, 4 plus years of college.
12in the week before the interview (Census de…nition) and equals zero otherwise.
The second, Positive Hours, is an indicator variable that equals one if a woman
worked a positive number of hours over the past week, and equals zero otherwise.
Lastly, Weeks Worked, is the same variable we used in our WWII analysis: it
indicates how many weeks a woman worked in the previous year.






, is our variable of interest. It is
the twenty-year-lagged ratio of the average fertility of working women relative
to that of non-working women in the individual’s state of birth. This variable
is calculated as the ratio of the average number of own children living in the
household of 30-35 years old working women (f!) relative to the same average for
30-35 years old non-working women (fn). The de…nition of a "working woman"
used to construct the fertility ratio varies to concord with the de…nition we are
using for the dependent variable (and for Lst¡20 as well).20 We expect that,
conditional on the same level of female labor supply, states characterized by a
higher relative fertility ratio of working to non-working women at a point in time
shouldalso be characterized by a higher labor supply of women twenty years later.
It is interesting to note that, independently of the de…nition of working woman
adopted, the average fertility ratio has been increasing over time for all de…nitions
of working woman. It went from an average across states of 0.34 in 1940 to 0.62
in 1960. Furthermore, at any point in time the variance in fertility ratios across
states is quite large. In 1940, the fertility ratio ranged from a minimum of .18
in Montana to a maximum of .63 in South Carolina, by 1960 it ranged from a
minimum of .28 in the District of Columbia and Delaware to a maximum of .78
for Mississippi. The mean across states and time periods is .49 with a standard
deviation of .13.21
Table V reports the results of our regression analysis. For all de…nitions of
working women, we …nd a positive and signi…cant relationship between women’s
working behavior and the average fertility ratio of working relative to non-working
women twenty years earlier. The magnitude of the e¤ect of fertility on future
female labor supply seems to be very similar across all de…nitions. In particular,
an increase by one standard deviation in the average fertility ratio is associated
with, twenty years later, an increase of 1.7 percentage points in LFP (i.e., an
20For the de…nition "weeks worked" we used whether a woman had worked a positive number
of weeks in the previous year, however, as the …rst is a continuous variable. Similar results were
obtained when we used alternative de…nitions to construct the fertility ratio.
21The numbers given here are for the LFP de…nition of a working woman. Similar means
and variances are obtained using the alternative de…nitions.
13increase of about 3.5% over its sample mean of 44 percent), an increase of .58
weeks per year in weeks worked (i.e., an increase of 3.3.% over its sample mean of
17.6 weeks), or with an increase in the proportion of women with positive hours
of 1.4 percentage points (an increase of around 3.2% over its sample mean).22
An important shortcoming of our analysis, of course, is that we are unable to
identify an exogenous source of variation in the fertility ratio.23 Nonetheless, the
positive correlation between the fertility ratio and female labor force participation
twenty years later constitutes suggestive evidence that favors our hypothesis.
4. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the dynamic model devel-
oped in Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2002). It explores the dynamic conse-
quences of two di¤erent sources of variation in the proportion of men brought up
by working mothers. We use variation in the WWII mobilization rates of men
across USstates to provide exogenous variationinthe magnitude of the shock that
the war provided to female labor supply. We show that the mobilization rate had
a positive impact on the labor supply of women most likely to have young children
during this period. This impact of WWII …nds an echo many decades later in the
labor supply of women who were too young to have been directly a¤ected by the
war, but who would have been a¤ected by the implied change in the composition
of the future marital pool–the cohort born in 1930-35. We show that whereas the
direct e¤ect of the war on older cohorts fades over time, the indirect e¤ect of the
war persists in the work behavior of the 1930-35 cohort during its life cycle. We
also provide a rough estimate of the magnitude of the intergenerational channel:
we …nd that an increase of one week in the average female labor supply leads to
an increase of 1.67 weeks worked in next’s generation female labor supply.
Our second source of variation is provided by di¤erences across states in their
relative fertility ratios. We analyze the e¤ect of variations in the ratio of the
22Our results are similar if we do not restrict the sample to women who reside in the same
state as their state of birth.
23It may be argued that the same factors that cause the fertility ratio to be higher in one
state relative to another, may also make it more attractive for young women to work more in
that state twenty years later. The simplest version of this critique, however, is taken care of
by controlling for the state’s lagged female labor supply alongside its lagged fertility rate (and
by including a state …xed e¤ect). Hence if, for example, one state has better child-care services
than another, making it easier for women both to work and to have children, this should be
captured by controlling for female labor supply.
14average fertility of working relative to non-working women on next generation’s
female labor supply. For a given level of female labor supply, variations in this
ratio imply variations in the proportion of children raised by working mothers
in the population and, accordingly to our theory, should generate di¤erent levels
of female labor force participation in the next generation. We examine this
relationship across states for several decades, and showthat a positive correlation
exists in the data, even after controlling for the state’s initial labor supply and a
state …xed e¤ect: an increase by one standard deviation in the average fertility
ratio is associated with anincrease of 1.7 percentage points in women’s labor force
participation twenty years later.
We consider our paper to be a contribution to a small but growing literature
that is interested in examining how attitudes (or preferences), social norms, or
culture in‡uence the evolution of the economy. We are especially interested in
attempting to assess the quantitative signi…cance of what are often considered
to be rather “fuzzy” variables, whose existence is often implicitly recognized but
rarely quanti…ed. These variables, however, may play a signi…cant role in many
economic phenomena, from female education and labor dynamics to fertility, con-
sumption, and investment decisions, and thus are too important to be neglected.
In particular, we have shown that there is a quantitatively important link be-
tween the proportion of men with working mothers and women’s propensity to
work. We think that studying the evolution of the family and its interaction with
the economy may be fertile ground for future research in this area.
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16Table I
State aggregrates in low, medium, and high mobilization rate states
low medium high
Percent Mobilization 1940-1947 44 47.5 51.3
(1.4) (1) (1.9)
Share Farmers 1940 37.1 22.9 14.5
(12.9) (11.1) (11.1)
Share Non-White 1940 18.8 7.5 2.8
(16.2) (7.3) (3.2)
Average Years Schooling 1940 7.78 8.76 9.3
(1.04) (.61) (.468)
Number of observations 16 16 15
Means and standard errors (in parentheses). The mobilization rates vary from a minimum of
41.2% to a maximum of 54.5%. We construct the low-mobilization category to include the 16
states where the mobilization rate was less than equal to 45.4%: GA, ND, NC, SD, SC, WI, LA,
AL, AR, MS, VA, TN, KY, IN, MI, IA. The medium-mobilization category includes the 16 sta-
tes where mobilization rates where above 45.4% and below 49%: MO, TX, NE, MN, MD, DE,
VT, IL, FL, NM, OH, WV, NY, WY, OK, KS. The high mobilization category includes the 15
states where mobilization rates where greater than equal to 49%: MT, CT, AZ, CO, NJ, ID, CA,
ME, WA, PA, UT, NH, OR, RI, MA. Mobilization rates are from Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle
(2004). They represent the fraction of of 18 to 44 years old males who were drafted for war be-
tween 1940 and 1947. Average years of education refers to years of completed education. The
share of farmers, of non-white and the average years of schooling represents state averages compu-
ted for males 13 to 44 in 1940. Census sample weights used for the calculations.
17Table II
Impact of WWII on Labor Supply of 42-47 years old Married Women
Dependent variable is “Weeks Worked”
1940&1950
1940 mobilization rate x year 19.64**
(8.71)
1940 share male non-white x year -2.37
(4.66)
1940 share male farmer x year 6.12***
(1.79)






Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at the state-year level. Estimation results are for a regression that
pools 42 to 47 years old women across two cohorts: the 1903-1908 cohort in 1950 and the 1893-1898 cohort in 1940. The dependent
variable, weeks worked, is regressed on the mobilization rate variable (interacted with a 1950 dummy) assigned by the woman’s state of
residence. We also control for state fraction of male farmers, the state fraction of non white males, and the state average education of
males in 1940. All the1940 variables (interacted with the 1950dummy) areassigned by the woman’s state of residence. All speci…cations
include state of residence dummies, a 1950 year dummy, age dummies, and the latter interacted with a 1950 dummy. Data are from
Census IPUMS one percent sample for both years. For the 1950 they refer to the sample line subsample. The regression is weighted by
census sampling weights. Our sample consists of 42 to 47 years old white married women residing in mainland U.S. states excluding
Nevada and DC, not living in institutional quarters, not living in farms or working in agricultural occupations. *Signi…cance at 10%
level. **Signi…cance at 5% level. ***Signi…cance at 1% level.
18Table III
Impact of WWII Mobilization Rates on Labor Supply of Married Women
Dependent variable is “Weeks Worked”
Panel A: 25 - 30
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1940 mobilization rate x 1950 18.11 17.29 21.68 22.59
(11.05) (10.99) (14.50) (14.24)
1940 mobilization rate x 1960 22.71** 19.06* 26.68* 26.39*
(11.30) (11.12) (15.1) (15.15)
Year 1950 -11.23* -11.49* -19.44** -17.06**
(6.26) (6.16) (7.51) (8.19)
Year 1960 -5.58 -3.24 -11.73* -14.54*
(5.89) (5.72) (7.02) (7.47)
St. of residence&husband’s st. of birth yes yes yes
Education yes
N. obs. 75,748 73,710 50,146 50,146
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.015 0.016 0.027
Panel B: 35 - 40
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1940 mobilization rate x 1950 25.25*** 23.67*** 33.02*** 34.49***
(8.36) (7.92) (9.99) (10.28)
1940 mobilization rate x 1960 18.34*** 18.17*** 22.55*** 24.74***
(6.76) (6.29) (7.89) (8.22)
1940 mobilization rate x 1970 14.24* 14.78** 22.01** 25.12***
(8.07) (7.51) (8.74) (8.64)
Year 1950 -2.25 -1.12 -11.88 -20.55***
(5.87) (5.63) (7.79) (7.90)
Year 1960 -3.76 -3.12 -7.30 -16.73**
(4.91) (4.75) (6.73) (6.81)
Year 1970 1.79 .99 -6.19 -7.58
(6.02) (5.65) (7.87) (9.02)
St. of residence&husband’s st. of birth yes yes yes
Education yes
N. obs. 112,125 109,864 71,018 71,018
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.045 0.05 0.05
19Panel C: 45 - 50
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1940 mobilization rate x 1950 12.59 17.92 27.98* 26.17*
(11.39) (11.59) (14.79) (14.79)
1940 mobilization rate x 1960 11.47 16.22* 15.44 15.33
(9.24) (9.29) (12.54) (12.59)
1940 mobilization rate x 1970 3.25 8.99 13.77 15.96
(8.56) (8.75) (12.31) (12.23)
1940 mobilization rate x 1980 17.26* 21.72** 32.89** 33.07**
(10.18) (10.76) (14.78) (14.78)
Year 1950 -14.55 -17.96** -27.31** -26.23**
(9.59) (9.44) (13.21) (13.08)
Year 1960 .52 -2.09 -7.95 -11.71
(6.53) (6.44) (10.39) (10.81)
Year 1970 9.50 5.07 1.82 -8.88
(6.84) (6.79) (10.27) (10.59)
Year 1980 8.18 5.01 -1.84 -7.01
(7.46) (7.60) (11.39) (11.80)
St. of residence&husband’s st. of birth yes yes yes
Education yes
N. obs. 129,899 126,715 80,261 80,261
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.091 0.098 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at the state-year level. Panel A pools 25-30 years old women across
cohorts by taking the 1930-1935 cohort in 1960, the 1920-1925 cohort in 1950 and the 1910-1915 cohort in 1940; panel B pools 35-40
years old women across cohorts by taking the 1930-1935 cohort in 1970, the 1920-1925 cohort in 1960, the 1910-1915 cohort in 1950
and the 1900-1905 cohort in 1940; panel C pools 45-50 years old women across cohorts by taking the 1930-1935 cohort in 1980, the
1920-1925cohort in 1970, the 1910-1915 cohort in 1960, the 1900-1905 cohort in 1950and the 1890-1895 cohort in 1940. The dependent
variable, weeks worked, is regressed on the mobilization rate variable (interacted with year dummies) assigned by the woman’s state of
birth. We also control for state fraction of male farmer, the state fraction of non white male, and the state average education of males in
1940. All the 1940 variables (interacted with year dummies) are also assigned by the woman’s state of birth. All speci…cations include
state of birth dummies, a year dummy, age dummies, and the latter interacted with a year dummy. Speci…cation (ii) also includes state
of residence dummies and husband’s state of birth dummies. Speci…cation (iii) restricts the sample to women who were born in the
same state they reside in. Speci…cation (iv) includes eight education dummies.and their interaction with year dummies. Education is
measured as the highest grade of school attended or completed by the respondent. Data are from Census IPUMS one percent sample
for all years. For the 1950 they refer to the sample line subsample. All speci…cations are weighted by census sampling weights. Our
sample consists of the age groups we study for white married women born in mainland U.S. states excluding Nevada and DC, not living
in institutional quarters, not living in farms or working in agricultural occupations. *Signi…cance at 10% level. **Signi…cance at 5%
level. ***Signi…cance at 1% level.
20TABLE IV
Impact of WWII Mobilization Rates on Labor Supply of 45 to 50 Married Women
Dependent variable is “Weeks Worked”
1940&1950 1950&1960 1960&1970 1970&1980
1940 mobilization rate x year 16.48** -11.66 -2.10 20.65***
(7.87) (8.46) (6.28) (7.07)
1940 share male non-white x year 4.56 -9.00* -1.77 -1.81
(4.91) (4.78) (4.54) (2.43)
1940 share male farmer x year 9.84*** -4.39* 2.23 2.96
(2.03) (2.42) (1.86) (2.55)
1940 male avg years educ x year 2.12*** -.96** -.46 -.21
(.436) (.476) (.576) (.225)
Year -22.35** 20.93*** 10.01 -4.37
(6.12) (7.62) (6.33) (4.69)
N. obs. 15,955 25,127 45,015 45,037
Adjusted R2 0.035 .029 .015 .017
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at the state-year level. Each column pools 45 to 50 years old women
two cohorts at a time. Column 1 pools the 1900-1905 cohort in 1950 and the 1890-1895 cohort in 1940; column 2 pools the 1910-1915
cohort in 1960 and the 1900-1905 cohort in 1950; column 3 pools the 1920-1925 cohort in 1970 and the 1910-1915 cohort in 1960;
column 4 pools the 1930-1935 cohort in 1980 and the 1920-1925 cohort in 1970. The dependent variable, weeks worked, is regressed
on the mobilization rate variable (interacted with year dummies) assigned by the woman’s state of birth. We also control for state
fraction of male farmer, the state fraction of non white male, and the state average education of males in 1940. All the 1940 variables
(interacted with year dummies) are also assigned by the woman’s state of birth. All speci…cations include state of birth dummies, year
dummies, age dummies, and the latter interacted with a year dummy. Data are from Census IPUMS one percent sample for all years.
For the 1950 they refer to the sample line subsample. All speci…cations are weighted by census sampling weights. Our sample consists
of 45 to 50 years old white married women born in mainland U.S. states excluding Nevada and DC, not living in institutional quarters,
not living in farms or working in agricultural occupations. The sample is further restricted to women who were born in the same state




LFP Positive Hours Weeks Worked
Avg Fertility Ratio t-20 .126¤¤¤ .104¤¤ 4.53¤¤
(.047) (.046) (2.33)
N. obs. 129341 129341 129341
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.16 0.18
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at the state-year level. Each column is for a separate pooled
regression for the years 1960 to 1980 of di¤erent measures of labor force participation for women 25-30 at time t on the average labor
force participation of women 30-35 twenty years before assigned by state of birth and on the ratio of average fertility of working women
age 30-35 over average fertility of non working women age 30 to 35 twenty years before also assigned by state of birth. The …rst
column uses the Census de…nition of LFP; the second column de…nes work as an indicator variable that equals 1 if a woman worked
positive hours during the week before the interview and the last column uses the number of weeks worked in previous year as dependent
variable. Average fertility is de…ned as average number of own children in the household and the de…nition of working versus non
working woman changes across colums accordingly to the de…nition adopted for the dependent variable in each speci…cation. In the
last column a woman is de…ned as working if she worked a positive number of weeks in the previous year. Our speci…cation also
includes a constant, state …xed e¤ects, year main e¤ects, age and marital status dummies, and their interaction with 1960, 1970, and
1980 dummies. Data are from Census IPUMS one percent sample for all years. For the 1950 they refer to the sample line subsample.
Our sample consists of white women residing in mainland U.S. states, not living in institutional quarters, not living in farms or working
in agricultural occupations. *Signi…cance at 10% level. **Signi…cance at 5% level. ***Signi…cance at 1% level.
22Appendix: Summary Characteristics of Married Women, 1940-1980
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
25 to 30 years old
Weeks Worked 8.83 10.25 11.78
(17.98) (18.29) (18.77)
Age 27.02 27.02 27.04
(1.41) (1.41) (1.42)
Husband’s Age 31.10 30.55 30.40
(5.22) (4.75) (4.43)
Number of observations 27,145 11,702 34,862
35 to 40 years old
Weeks Worked 7.44 10.79 14.01 18.02
(16.95) (19.09) (20.49) (21.81)
Age 36.94 36.92 36.98 37.01
(1.43) (1.41) (1.41) (1.42)
Husband’s age 40.81 40.60 40.30 40.19
(5.64) (5.33) (5.12) (5.01)
Number of observations 22,979 10,153 41,595 35,137
45 to 50 years old
Weeks Worked 5.52 11.81 17.91 21.83 26.26
(15.00) (19.97) (22.18) (23.05) (23.59)
Age 46.91 46.95 46.90 46.96 47.03
(1.40) (1.42) (1.41) (1.41) (1.43)
Husband’s Age 50.32 50.57 50.25 49.92 50.11
(5.64) (5.76) (5.69) (5.41) (4.88)
Number of observations 16,717 6,922 32,007 38,082 33,999
Means and standard errors (in parentheses). Data are from the Census IPUMS one percent sample for 1940 to 1980. Data for
1950 refer to the sample line subsample. The sample consists of white married women belonging to three age groups: 25-30, 35-40, and
45-50. We exclude women living in farms or employed in farming, women living in institutional group quarters and women who were
born in Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, D.C. or abroad.
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